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Why are Neo-liberal Ideas so Resilient in Europe’s Political Economy 
 
Vivien A. Schmidt and Mark Thatcher  
 
Despite the economic crisis that hit full force in 2008 in the US and Europe, political 
leaders have made little attempt to rethink the neo-liberal ideas that are in large part 
responsible for the boom and bust, let alone to come to terms with how immoderate the 
‘Great Moderation’ really was. Much the contrary, neo-liberal ideas seem to continue to 
constitute the ruling ideas.  In the financial markets, where the crisis began, reregulation 
remains woefully inadequate, while the only ideas in play are neo-liberal, either for more 
‘market-enhancing’ regulation or in favor of greater laissez-faire. The biggest puzzle, 
however, is the response to the crisis by Eurozone countries that have embraced ‘market 
discipline’ through austerity and, in so doing, have condemned themselves to slow or no 
growth.   This is in contrast to the US, which has posted better economic results, despite 
being torn between Republican fundamentalists advocating austerity and a more 
pragmatic leadership focused on growth. 
 
Our question, then, is:  How do we explain the resilience of neo-liberal economic ideas?  
Since the 1980s, why have such ideas not just survived but continued to be dominant? 
Neo-liberalism entails belief in competitive markets enhanced by global free trade and 
capital mobility, backed up by a pro-market, limited state that promotes labor market 
flexibility and seeks to reduce welfare dependence while marketizing the provision of 
public goods.  The watchwords for such neo-liberalism are liberalization, privatization, 
deregulation, and delegation to non-majoritarian institutions such as ‘independent’ 
regulatory agencies and central banks.  The touchstones highlight the importance of 
individual responsibility, the value of competition, and the centrality of market allocation.  
The neo-liberal mantra presents the state as the perennial problem, the market as the 
solution—even today, despite the fact that the crisis was caused by the markets, not the 
state.   
 
Resilience itself should be seen as a process, not a fixed state. It can be highly political, 
marked by struggles to determine agendas, set goals and select policies. And it may vary 
both across domains and countries. In a few areas—notably welfare—after extending 
their reach, neo-liberal ideas have faced social-democratic counter-attacks and then 
evolved into a new synthesis in which social-democratic values continue to underpin the 
welfare state despite the use of neo-liberal policy tools. In other domains, neo-liberal 
ideas may have produced the opposite of what they initially intended, such as how the 
roll back of the state to free up the markets metamorphosed into state roll-out and a new 
synthesis with not less but more state, albeit a much more liberal one.  Moreover, in some 
Eastern European countries, policies justified by neo-liberal ideas have come to face 
strong opposition after years of unquestioning acceptance while neo-liberal rhetoric has 
long faced rejection in France, despite implementation of neo-liberal policy.  
 
But be this as it may, the core principles of neo-liberalism have continued to 
predominate. Competition has been the central concept for debates about the organisation 
of markets both at the EU level and at the national level, not just in Anglo-Saxon polities 
such as the UK and Ireland, but even in more corporatist and social democratic countries 
such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark. ‘Competitiveness’ has been the goal for 
national economies and firms across Europe, including in statist countries such as Italy 
and France. Austerity and ‘structural reform’ continue to dominate Eurozone crisis 
debates, with active labour market policy focused largely on increasing labour market 
‘flexibility’.  Overall, what is striking is how often neo-liberal ideas have been resilient in 
the past thirty or so years in political discourse and policy debates in Europe.   
 
So how can we explain such resilience?  Why, especially in light of the crisis, has there 
been no major shift in ideas, either back to the neo-Keynesianism that brought the 
postwar ‘Golden Years,’ beyond a fleeting moment in 2008-2009, or forward to 
something new? How do we explain the fact that neo-liberalism continues to permeate 
how people think and talk about state and market?  We propose five lines of analysis to 
explain such resilience:  the flexibility of neo-liberalism’s core principles; the gaps 
between neo-liberal rhetoric and reality; the strength of neo-liberal discourse in debates; 
the power of interests in the strategic use of ideas; and the force of institutions in the 
embedding of neo-liberal ideas.   
 
Neo-Liberalism’s Ideational Generality, Diversity, and Mutability 
The first line of analysis of the resilience of neo-liberalism focuses on the generality of its 
core principles, such as the centrality of market allocation, the value of competition, or 
the importance individual responsibility make it highly adaptable to changing 
circumstances and needs.  While the generality of neo-liberalism makes it hard to pin 
down, its diversity enables it to absorb many different and even contradictory ideas at the 
same time that its mutability enhances its adaptability to changing and even hostile 
terrains, allowing also for metamorphosis and hybridization.   
 
Neo-liberalism’s mutability is apparent in its ability to change its views of the state, as 
noted above, by moving from ideas focused on the ‘rollback’ of the state to free up the 
markets in the 1980s under conservative leaders to the ‘rollout’ of the state to make 
markets work more freely under progressives in the 1990s and even to the ‘ramp up’ of 
the (supranational EU) state during the crisis of the Euro area.  Neo-liberalism has also 
been able to absorb seemingly contradictory ideas, as in the case of the welfare state, 
where after an initial clash with social democratic ideas, through attempts at passive 
reduction of social spending and job protections, it incorporated such ideas in programs 
that sought to make active use of the welfare state to promote market efficiency via 
‘active labor market policies.’ It has equally been able to undergo metamorphoses such 
that ideas discredited in previous periods recur, returning in new guises, such as the 
1920s discourse of ‘sound money’ reappearing in the 1970s as monetarism and in the late 
2000s as ‘sustainable debt.’   
 
Finally, neo-liberalism has also experienced hybridization, with its capacity for diffusion 
and translation into diverse national contexts enabling it to gain ground even in countries 
with deeply entrenched social-democratic ideals such as Germany and Sweden.  These 
countries integrated key principles of neo-liberalism in different ways to produce hybrids 
of what Gerhard Schnyder and Gregory Jackson call ‘corporatist-managed liberalization,’ 
in which the social partners are important participants in ensuring internationally 
competitive firms. 
 
Thus, a key part of an analysis of the resilience of neo-liberalism is seeing it as an overall 
orientation, characterized by a core set of first principles rather than a specific and 
falsifiable set of theories or doctrines or proposals. But focusing on neo-liberalism in 
terms of ideas alone is insufficient.  Explanation also requires identification of political 
processes and actors, as well as the context within which they operate. 
 
Neo-Liberal Rhetoric versus Reality, or the Benefits of Non-Implementation 
The second line of analysis of neo-liberal resilience suggests that it often works only in 
the rhetoric, not in the reality of implementation.  But rather than discrediting neo-
liberalism, non-implementation may actually benefit it, since it can thereby remain an 
ideal yet to be accomplished, and as such can repeatedly return in debates and political 
programs.   
 
Notably, many neo-liberal policies – such as cutting public spending, reforming welfare, 
and reducing regulatory protection – are difficult to implement and extremely unpopular 
politically.  This helps explain why promises to cut back the state for the most part turned 
out to be hollow, in particular as state restructuring did not lead to a decrease in its size, 
nor did it necessarily reduce public spending.  Deregulation, rather than getting rid of the 
state, simply led to reregulation of a different kind.  But rather than a weakness, this can 
be seen as a strength.  Past non-implementation allows neo-liberal politicians to distance 
themselves from the policies of their predecessors, whether from their own party or those 
of their opponents.  It may also serve as a rallying cry, to call for more neo-liberalism, 
with appeals to an ideal future thereby distracting attention from the past’s real failures or 
the grim realities of the present.  Finally, neo-liberalism can also help alter the terms of 
the debate, say, from ‘whether to cut’ to ‘how fast to cut,’ as with deficit reduction in the 
Euro area, or by recasting pensions or welfare payments as ‘wasteful burdens’ rather than 
the earned rights of citizens.  
 
This second line of analysis offers a powerful response to arguments that neo-liberalism 
does not exist because many of its specific policies have not been implemented.  Indeed, 
its ideational breadth and inclusion of contradictory elements make it particularly likely 
to benefit from the gap between rhetoric and policy reality. However this explanation also 
raises a number of questions, most importantly, why have policy makers not taken up 
alternative ideas that are more practicable? This draws attention to the political value of 
neo-liberal ideas in political debate, the way it may serve the purposes of certain interests, 
or how the political system itself permits impossible ideas that resemble fairy tales to be 
told and re-told, despite contrary experiences. 
 
The Strength of Neo-Liberal Ideas in Policy Debates and Political Discourse 
The third line of analysis points to the fact that neo-liberal ideas have generally been 
more successful in policy debates and political discourse, winning in the ‘battle of ideas’ 
against weaker alternatives.  This may arise from the content of the ideas themselves, 
how political entrepreneurs use these ideas to frame the problems of the day, and how 
they communicate those ideas.  Alternatively, it may be due to the weakness of 
alternative ideas than with the strength of neo-liberal ideas per se. 
 
In some cases, the strength of neo-liberalism may come from the seemingly common 
sense nature of neo-liberal arguments.  For example, appeals to the ‘virtue’ of sound 
finances using the metaphor of the household economy—extrapolating from the need to 
balance one’s household budget to the need to do the same for the state budget—may 
resonate better with ordinary citizens than the Keynesian counterintuitive proposition to 
spend more at a time of high deficits and debts.  In other cases, neo-liberal success can be 
attributed to the reframing of current problems of the Eurozone—say, as a crisis of public 
debt rather than of the banks; to the narratives—about public profligacy being the 
problem, belt-tightening the solution; and to the myths—for the Germans, that belt-
tightening is the only way to avoid the risks of hyperinflation of the early 1920s, thereby 
ignoring the risks of deflation and unemployment of the early 1930s that led to the rise of 
Hitler.   
 
At the national level too, neo-liberalism has seemed better placed in policy debates than 
its competitors. In Eastern Europe, it appeared to promise eventual economic growth, 
whereas the alternatives were dependence on a state that has suffered from links with past 
communism or present right-wing nationalism in countries such as Hungary and Poland. 
In France and Italy, statist paradigms have been condemned as poorly adapted to a global 
economy and/or as leading to excessive state spending, corruption, and inadequate or 
unresponsive public administration.  Even the disasters of private sector financialisation 
in Britain and Ireland have been followed by debates about how much state austerity to 
pursue, rather than structural reforms of the housing and financial markets or Keynesian 
policies to offset falls in private sector demands. 
 
Yet another factor responsible for the ability of neo-liberal ideas to ‘beat’ ideational 
competitors has been the effectiveness of neo-liberal ideational entrepreneurs’ 
communication in policy debates and political discourse.  These include political elites 
and entrepreneurs such as Reagan in the US, Thatcher in the UK, Balcerowicz in Poland, 
and Klaus in the Czech Republic. However, it extends to technocratic elites such as 
members of the European Commission whose authority results from their expertise, and 
also to academic elites, mainly economists like Friedman in Chicago, Hayek in London, 
and contemporary economists whose simple models embed neo-liberal assumptions 
about rational actors in free markets and provide ‘authoritative’ references for 
technocratic and political elites alike. 
 
Equally importantly, it may be that neo-liberals are not so strong but their opponents are 
weak.  Where, after all, have the center-left parties been in all of this, in particular in 
Europe throughout the Eurozone crisis?  Notably, only very recently have European 
social democratic leaders called for growth, even as they continue to dole out austerity.  
But they have not offered any fully developed alternative policy program, let alone one 
that can rival the neo-liberal in its simplicity and apparent common sense, as noted above.  
 
This third line of explanation has many virtues, notably in highlighting the central place 
of neo-liberal values, theories and paradigms in public policy debates. However, it cannot 
explain why in some domains, such as welfare, clear alternative values and paradigms 
exist, such that neo-liberalism became part of a new synthesis, by contrast with an area 
like finance, where it predominates. It also cannot account for why, given the Eurozone 
crisis and neo-liberalism’s own weaknesses, alternatives have not been seriously 
attempted.  These problems suggest that other explanatory factors also matter, notably 
key actors’ use of neo-liberal ideas to further their interests and the institutional 
framework within which neo-liberal ideas are formed, developed, disseminated, debated, 
and adopted by policy makers.  
 
The power of interests as the winners from neo-liberalism 
The fourth line of analysis explains neo-liberal resilience in terms of the powerful 
coalitions of interests that often take up neo-liberal ideas for their own strategic purposes, 
whether they believe in them or not.  Economic actors may benefit materially, notably 
through lower taxes or the new opportunities opened up by ‘deregulation’ and 
privatization. Bankers have been laughing all the way to the bank.  Politicians also can 
benefit by using neo-liberal ideas to gain or retain political power while institutional 
actors—regulators, central bankers, and the like—gain autonomy and increasing power.  
 
These self-interested actors may contribute to the production and propagation of neo-
liberal ideas in a variety of ways in efforts to further their own interests, whether in 
policy venues or in more general public settings.  Some economic interests may act 
directly in popularizing neo-liberal ideas, such as the mass media companies, in particular 
those controlled by politically active media ‘moguls’ such as Rupert Murdoch in the UK, 
Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, or Martin Bouygues in France.  Others contribute more 
indirectly to the production or popularization of neo-liberal ideas by establishing, 
supporting, and financing neo-liberal societies, think-tanks and research institutes such as 
the Mont Pélerin Society or the Institute of Economic Affairs, or by participating in the 
shaping of policy agendas or the creation of specific policy ideas.  Most also participate 
in broad coalitions to promote their interests, with elected politicians and political parties 
but also unelected officials serving as vital ‘accomplices. ’ Such coalitional influence is 
visible in areas such as in the regulation of financial markets, mergers, and corporate 
governance, where advocacy coalitions of large firms and their managers have coalesced 
with EU and/or national government officials, behind neo-liberal ideas of expanding and 
protecting competition. 
 
All of this, moreover, tends to be self-reinforcing, since the more neo-liberalism takes 
hold, the more it is likely to consolidate such actors’ commitment to neo-liberal ideas, as 
well as to create an attitude of ‘if you can’t beat them, join them.’ This helps explain the 
center-left’s adoption of neo-liberal ideas, beginning in the mid 1990s with Clinton in the 
US and Blair in the UK, followed by Schröder in Germany and Jospin in France, not to 
mention other smaller European member-states such as the Netherlands or Sweden. 
 
This kind of interest-based explanation is valuable as it brings to the fore who gains and 
loses from neo-liberal ideas.  However, actor interests do not always simply map onto 
ideational preferences, since economic actors need not only support neo-liberal ideas but 
may instead back hybrids, such as corporatism or social democracy.  Moreover, an 
explanation focused on interests cannot account for how and why labour and the 
beneficiaries of a wide range of social policies have lost in the policy debates or switched 
their views, in particular given their larger numbers.  While part of the answer may rest in 
the difficulties of collective action or theories about ‘capture’ by interest groups, another 
part relates to the (re)construction of actors’ ideas, which refers to the earlier three lines 
of analysis about neo-liberal ideas.  Attributes such as flexibility, high levels of generality 
or appeals to ‘common sense’ and personal experience also help explain why neo-liberal 
ideas may be particularly suitable for rewarding powerful supporters, creating coalitions 
and selling them to the public.  
 
The strongest objection to interest-based explanations is internal, however.  Frequently 
neo-liberal policies damage their supporters.  Political parties and politicians espousing 
radically neo-liberal ideas have rarely weathered the transition into political office 
successfully.  Ideas of reducing collective benefits such as healthcare, pensions and 
education are vote losers—even in Britain, the most favourable ‘micro-climate’ for neo-
liberalism in Western Europe, while in Central and Eastern Europe, the initial popularity 
of neo-liberalism has given way to disillusion.   Hence the most penetrating questions 
may concern how and why those interests are constructed and especially why actors find 
neo-liberal ideas as the best way to serve those interests. This leads us back to the other 
explanatory factors but also forward to the role of institutions in shaping incentives or in 
constraining action. 
 
The force of institutions as supports and constraints 
The fifth line of analysis points to the ways in which neo-liberal ideas gain force from 
their institutionalization in the rules and regulations, as well as from the institutions that 
have affected the uptake of neo-liberal ideas in a variety of ways.  Their influence can be 
analysed in terms of different ‘neo-institutionalisms’, including the rationalist shaping of 
actors’ institutional incentives to favour neo-liberal ideas; the historical 
institutionalization of neo-liberal ideas, such that these become ‘path-dependent’ 
constraints or set the limits to opportunities for incremental change; the sociological 
framing of agents’ institutional engagement, whether through mimesis, norm-following, 
or coercion; and the discursive interactions that in turn structure the (re)construction and 
spread of ideas. 
 
In terms of organizations, the EU’s new non-majoritarian institutions from the 1980s 
onwards have actively promoted neo-liberal ideas.  These include the independent 
regulatory bodies such as the independent central banks, the international credit-rating 
agencies, and the standard-setting bodies that are out of the reach of national state 
control.  For the EU, we need mention only the ECB and the European Commission, 
including the Directorate General in charge of Competition or of Economic and Monetary 
affairs.  Moreover, in the EU, the institutionalization of neo-liberal ideas in successive 
pacts for stability in the Eurozone – beginning with the Stability and Growth Pact that 
consecrated the 1990s Maastricht criteria for monetary union and culminating with 
various pacts during the Eurozone crisis – ensure that neo-liberal ideas about fiscal 
consolidation will be difficult to reverse, regardless of their failure to solve the crisis.  
 
Often the rules prove coercive, in particular where authoritative institutions use their 
powers of imposition rather than of persuasion.  The most visible examples are the cases 
of EU Commission and IMF conditionality in Eastern Europe; the ‘Troika’ of the IMF, 
ECB, and EU Commission in recent ‘Eurozone’ bailouts of Greece, Ireland and Portugal.  
But even without a direct quid pro quo, coercion is significant, be this through the 
succession of pacts and compacts requiring member-states to adhere to more and more 
stringent rules regarding EMU, or through less formally institutionalized means, such as 
when member-states face pressures to adopt neo-liberal prescriptions in order to maintain 
‘credibility’ with the markets.  Finally, instead of being imposed via coercion, followed 
because of path-dependence, or adopted in response to incentives, neo-liberal ideas can 
inspire mimesis, because they have become ‘fashionable’, or norm-following, because 
they are seen as the only legitimate course of action. 
 
Institutionalist analyses of neo-liberal ideational resilience have many virtues. One is that 
they underline the importance of institutionally derived resources and positions while 
bringing out the restrictions and constraints within which policy makers think about 
policies. Thus, in contrast to the first three explanations, an institutionalist analysis sees 
ideational debates as embedded in organizations and structures.  It also differs from an 
interest-based one in underlining that actors and their interests are created by and operate 
within wider structures and broader institutional contexts.  This helps explain the 
variation in the embedding of neo-liberal ideas in the member-states, such as in the 
differential success of active labour market policies in Britain versus Denmark or the 
different paths taken with regard to labor market policy even between countries within 
one variety of capitalism, whether Britain versus Ireland or Poland versus Hungary. 
 
Institutionalist analyses, however, also have their limits, in particular because they leave 
considerable room for interpretation within a given set of rules. Thus for instance, there is 
considerable space within EU rules on competition for pursuit of objectives other than 
competition.  These include different forms of public service and industrial policy.  
Moreover, even within the rules on monetary union, there has been space for the ECB to 
take ‘unorthodox measures’ to save the euro.  Notably, changes in rules have sometimes 
countered neo-liberal movements. In welfare policy, for example, neo-liberalism has 
faced alternative ideas about rights based on gender, sexuality or handicap that drew 
strength from EU law and ECJ decisions.  Third, some of the organisations seen as 
carriers of neo-liberal ideas have sometimes acted to promote alternative ideas, as when 
the European Commission has initiated discussions about the stake-holder model of 
corporate governance and alternative modes of regulation of network industries. Even the 
IMF, a core carrier of neo-liberalism, called for Keynesian measures and slower moves 
towards austerity after 2008, and criticized EU Commission policy. Finally, referring 
back to the previous lines of analysis, the political process can constitute a source of 
friction, generating new ideas and coalitions against neo-liberalism, in particular when 
events—or interpretations thereof—seem to give the lie to neo-liberal policy and 
programmatic ideas. 
 Conclusion 
These five lines of analysis leave us with one final question: given all this resilience, is 
there any way out of neo-liberalism?  One pathway could be collapse from within, as the 
contradictions inherent in neo-liberalism become increasingly clear—such as between the 
ideal of a limited state and the practice of the state playing a strong role to enhance 
markets.  Another could be rejection from without, as the broken promises, indeed the 
failures, of neo-liberalism become ever more apparent to citizens.   Yet another is that 
strong ideational alternatives to neo-liberalism gain strength, say, with new approaches to 
economic governance that put the polity before, rather than after, the economy.  It is also 
possible that neo-liberalism loses the support of powerful interests, or that new coalitions 
emerge.  Perhaps the social democrats will begin to coalesce behind a new set of ideas.  
Finally, it may very well be that the institutions of neo-liberalism break down, are 
replaced, or evolve as a result of new coalitions of interests with new ideas about how to 
solve the problems.  But for any of these eventualities, things are likely to become much 
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